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Competition, Consumer Protection and Energy
Deregulation: A Conference Introduction
Spencer Weber Waller*

I. INTRODUCTION

It is most fitting that the deregulation of the energy industry, and in
particular the introduction of competition in electrical power, was the
subject of the fall 2001 conference at Loyola University Chicago School
of Law sponsored by the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies and
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal.1 While there are many
important and controversial issues pending in the antitrust area, 2 none
has the direct and immediate impact on consumers as the deregulation
of electrical power. Electricity is one of the few true necessities in life,
and the deregulatory process is fraught with complicated scientific,
economic, and legal issues. Important questions remain whether
consumers truly will benefit from greater competition and still receive
secure reliable service as needed.
Nearly half the states have begun the deregulatory process for
electricity. 3
The inefficiencies of traditional regulation and
technological progress have changed the way we look at the energy
industry and led to significant policy changes as to what segments of the
industry should continue to be regulated as natural monopolies and what
segments should be opened to competition. For example, in Illinois,

*
Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law.
1. The American Antitrust Institute and Commonwealth Edison/Exelon Corp. were cosponsors of the conference as well. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Bert Foer, the President
of the American Antitrust Institute, and Rebecca Lauer, the former general counsel of
Commonwealth Edison, for their help on this project.
2. The continuing saga of the Microsoft litigation and the controversy surrounding the
European Union's blocking of the GE/Honeywell merger after its clearance by the Department of
Justice are merely two such issues.
3. See FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF, REPORT BY THE FTC STAFF, COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: Focus

ON RETAIL COMPETITION 7 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/elec/
electricityreport.pdf [hereinafter 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT].
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competition for retail customers of electricity is scheduled to begin in
4
May 2002 with competition for industrial users already in place.
The challenge is to introduce competition for the benefit of
consumers so that consumers will have a meaningful choice in the
market for the distribution of electrical power and the ability to fully
and fairly exercise that choice. 5 Done correctly, deregulation holds
great promise for the consumer. Done poorly, it leads only to the chaos
that has occurred in California or the horrors of inefficient regulated
monopolists being replaced by unregulated monopolists.
In this brief introduction, I will set forth the history and mission of
the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies as a voice for a consumerfriendly competitive economy, the special challenges posed by the
deregulation of the electrical power industry, and the conference that
was convened on November 2, 2001 to explore competition, consumer
protection, and energy deregulation.
II.

THE INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER ANTITRUST STUDIES

The Loyola University Chicago Institute for Consumer Antitrust
Studies is a non-partisan, independent academic center designed to
explore the impact of antitrust law enforcement on the individual
consumer and to shape public policy. The Institute promotes a
comprehensive, inclusive view of the benefits of competition law and
policy that includes, but goes beyond, prevailing narrow notions of
economic efficiency. The Institute fulfills its mission by sponsoring
symposia, academic colloquia, and consumer education classes,
publishing working papers, undertaking research projects, and funding a
unique student fellowship.
The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies owes its existence to the
perseverance of two extraordinary people, the late Judge Hubert Will,

4. For details of deregulation of electricity in Illinois, see http://www.icc.state.il.us/icc (web
site of the Illinois Commerce Commission) and http://www.citizensutilityboard.org (web site of
Citizens Utility Board). Each contains a variety of summaries and evaluations of the introduction
of competition in electrical power under Illinois law.
5. The concept of consumer choice is central to competition law and unites both traditional
antitrust and consumer protection policy. See generally Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande,
Consumer Choice: The PracticalReason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10
LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty:
A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997);
Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503
(2001); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm,
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 535 (2001).

2002] Competition, Consumer Protection and Energy Deregulation

751

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and
Dean Nina Appel of Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Beginning in the 1980s, Judge Will increasingly believed that the
centrist tradition in American antitrust law was threatened by the
influence of the so-called Chicago school of antitrust analysis 6 and the
associated well-funded group of think tanks, academic literature, and
judicial education programs that relentlessly sought to inculcate what he
considered a false belief that a narrow definition of allocative efficiency
was the only value at stake in antitrust. More importantly, Judge Will
decided to do something about it. In supervising the settlement of a
major private treble damage antitrust class action case, Judge Will
announced that he would entertain proposals under the doctrine of cy
pres,7 so that the funds remaining after all claims, fees and costs had
been paid could be used to promote the interests of consumers in the
ongoing antitrust debate.
Dean Nina Appel became aware of this opportunity and prepared,
with the help of the Loyola faculty and friends in the antitrust
community, the proposal that ultimately became the Institute for
Consumer Antitrust Studies. Judge Will selected the Loyola proposal
over the competing proposals he received and directed the funds to
Loyola. 8 This proved to be the beginning, rather than the end, of the
process. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Will's decision
with respect to the left over funds, 9 and all monies were returned to the
court. It was only in a subsequent settlement of a different antitrust case
that Judge Will followed the road map laid out for him by the Seventh
Circuit and ultimately awarded similar funding to the Institute and the
proposal again championed by Dean Appel.10 The Institute has
received additional funding and support from Loyola University
Chicago, subsequent cy pres court decisions, foundations, law firms,
corporations, and individuals. "1
The Institute began under the leadership of Professor Jane Locke of
the Loyola University Chicago law faculty and carved out for itself a
unique niche as the only academic public interest center focusing on
6. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
7. For a discussion of the origins of the cy pres doctrine, see Matthew Perkins, Note, The Cy
Pres Doctrine in the 1980s: The Casefor CharitableFavoritism, 10 PROB. L.J. 163, 163 (1990).
8. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. II1. 1988).
9. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 881 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1989).
10. Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
11. Recent donations and grants are set forth on the Institute web site at http://www.luc.edu/
/antitrust.
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both antitrust and consumer protection law. Living up to its mandate
from Judge Will, the Institute began examining issues of competition
from the perspective of the consumer and insisting that such benefits
must be tangible, and not merely theoretical in the sense of wealth
maximization for producers. The Institute sponsored consumer12
education classes as well as conferences on antitrust and health care,
antitrust and the millennium,1 3 and consumer protection issues for the
elderly.
In the past two years, the Institute has implemented a number of new
programs. The Institute created a unique fellowship for students at the
law school to both study and shape competition and consumer
protection policy. Student Fellows are selected from incoming students
and after completion of the first year of study. Fellows must maintain
standing in the top third of the class and pursue a structured curriculum
to provide the proper background to practice in the field which
culminates in research and field work in their third year. Students
receive a financial stipend, attend all Institute events, attend local and
national antitrust conferences, and enjoy special informal programs
designed to inform them of key topics and introduce them to
policymakers in the public and private sector. Fellows receive
individualized assistance in obtaining appropriate summer and
permanent positions in the field. There are currently nine student
fellows of the Institute, and its first fellow graduated in January 2002.
For the academy, the Institute sponsors the annual Midwest Antitrust
Colloquium to support the work of professors in law and related
disciplines who share the Institute's centrist pro-consumer orientation.
The first colloquium was convened in April 2001 and featured over
thirty attendees for a day of papers, commentary, and discussion. A
number of the papers from the colloquium have been published," 4 and
an expanded second annual Midwest Antitrust Colloquium was held in
April 2002, this time underwritten by a generous grant from the
Coleman Foundation.

12. Symposium, Can Antitrust Law Cure Health Care?, 8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 76-166
(1995-1996). This conference was co-sponsored by the Institute for Health Law of Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. See http://www.luc.edu/schoolslaw/hlthlaw/index.htm.
13. Colloquy, Antitrust Law for the New Millennium: An Examination of Leading Issues in
Antitrust Enforcement Policy for the Approaching Age, 9 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 111-92
(1997).
14. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriersfor Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 (2001); Spencer Weber
Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283
(2001).
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The Institute web site features a number of free publications designed
both for the public and antitrust professionals. 15 The working paper
series includes scholarly and shorter works from faculty members at
Loyola University Chicago and other law schools embodying the
Institute's philosophy. A Consumer's Guide to Antitrust, prepared by
Institute Advisory Board Member William Gotfryd, outlines the basic
tenets of the antitrust laws and the commitment to free markets for the
benefit of consumers that has animated United States antitrust policy
since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.16 Finally, the newsletter
of the Institute is available on-line as well. 17
The Advisory Board is another key component of the Institute.
Building toward an eventual membership of twenty-five, the Board
assists the Institute director and staff as a source of ideas for programs,
speakers, research projects, competition advocacy before state and
federal agencies and legislatures, job placement, funding opportunities,
and provides valuable direction to the evolving nature of the Institute.
The Board reflects the basic philosophy of the Institute as to the
importance of the antitrust and consumer protection laws and their
vigorous enforcement, but includes representatives from all segments of
the bar, corporations, government, and academia. 18 Because of the
international nature of antitrust in the new millennium, plans are
underway to constitute a similar International Advisory Board.
Although the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies remains a work
in progress, it remains defined best by its public programs over nearly a
decade since its initial creation and funding. To fulfill its mission of
examining antitrust from the consumer perspective, the Institute focused
in the fall of 2001 on the potential benefits and risks posed by the
rapidly, but unevenly, developing deregulation of the electrical power
industry. 19
III.

THE CHALLENGE OF ELECTRICAL DEREGULATION

The deregulation of the electrical power industry takes place in the
long shadow of the deregulatory movement both in the United States
and abroad. Over the past thirty years, industries such as airlines,

15. Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, at http://www.luc.edu/antitrust.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The full membership of the Advisory Board can be found on the Institute web site.
http://www.luc.edu/antitrust.
19. See 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at app. A (describing differing deregulation
initiatives in twelve key states).
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trucking, telecommunications, and various segments of the energy
industry have undergone deregulation with varying degrees of
success. 20 Outside of the United States, similar experiments with
deregulation 2 1 have proceeded, often at a pace that would astonish
United States observers.
Electricity is, however, fundamentally different from the prior
industries subject to deregulation. Electricity is necessary for modern
life. It has few reasonably effective substitutes, and it has a
substantially inelastic demand curve making consumers vulnerable to
price increases in times of shortage or when faced with exercise of
market power. Compounding the situation is the current state of
engineering in the electrical power field where electricity cannot be
effectively stored, and the path of generated electricity cannot be strictly
controlled. Power must thus be added or taken from a series of regional
and state transmission grids which must be balanced in real time in
order to avoid brownouts, blackouts, and other system failures.
For largely historical reasons, the generation and retail distribution of
electricity has been regulated by the public utility commissions of the
fifty states, while wholesale transactions and the interstate transmission
of power has been regulated at the federal level by the agency now
known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of the Interior, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Defense Department, and other
federal agencies also have participated in different aspects of national
energy policy. At the state level, the state public service commissions
are joined by the state attorney generals, local governments, and other
agencies in regulating aspects of the industry. Deregulation thus is not a
single process controlled by a single player but a multi-dimensional
game with multiple players at both the federal and state levels.
A broad consensus nonetheless emerged that traditional cost-plus
price regulation of vertically integrated monopolists has failed. The
natural monopolist rationale for traditional regulation was challenged in
favor of a model of competitive generation and distribution with natural
monopoly utilities limited to the transmission of electrical power as
20. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, ECONOMIC REGULATION (1994).
21. Frequently this process outside the United States has been linked or preceded by a process
of privatization because of the greater degree of public ownership of such industries. One of the
ironies of the recent experiences in California has been the unintended interjection of de facto
public ownership and control of previously private California electrical utilities because of the
failure of the deregulatory process used in that state. See Richard D. Cudahy, Full Circle in the
Formerly Regulated Industries?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 767 (2002).
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non-discriminatory common carriers. As of November 2001, the FERC
and approximately half of the states had implemented different versions
and visions of deregulation each on their own timetable. In Illinois, the
basic legislative initiative was created in 1997 with deregulated
wholesale prices, substantial mandated consumer rate reductions in
1998 and 2000, rapid introduction of competition in distribution of
power for industrial users, and the introduction of choice for retail
customers beginning in May of 2002.22
Assessing the successes and failures of these various deregulatory
regimes has been clouded by the spectacular failure of the process in
California which, in hindsight, was flawed from the inception. More
recently, the unrelated, but equally spectacular, failure of Enron
Corporation has caused others to further question deregulation.
Regardless of these high profile disasters, deregulation has brought
consumers in certain states lower prices, greater choice, greater
efficiency in generation, transmission, and distribution, preservation of
reliable service, and environmental preservation. 2 3 For most states, it is
simply too early to tell.
IV. THE CONFERENCE

These were the issues explored when the Institute and Law Journal
conference convened on November 2, 2001. The conference was cosponsored by the American Antitrust Institute and Commonwealth
Edison/Exelon Corp. 24 which each provided generous financial and
other assistance, and was well attended by a national audience of
students, academics, practitioners, government officials, and consumer
advocates.
The conference began with a keynote address by Commissioner
Thomas Leary of the United States Federal Trade Commission. In his
thoughtful discussion, Commissioner Leary set the stage for the panels
that followed by questioning the continued utility of the overlapping
state and federal regulation of different aspects of the electrical power
25
industry.
22. See supra note 4 (providing websites discussing the deregulation of electricity in Illinois).
23. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware are frequently praised in this regard
although a number of commentators question whether these results can be duplicated on a more
general basis.
24. See supra note 1.
25. Thomas B. Leary, A Comment on Regulation and Deregulation in a Nation With Multiple
Sovereigns, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 759 (2002). The FTC generally has taken a leading role in
competition advocacy before state and federal regulatory agencies to assure the preservation of
competition and consumer protection principles in the deregulatory process. The Institute
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The first panel on the antitrust/deregulation dilemma followed
Commissioner Leary's keynote address. Milton Marquis of Jenner &
Block began the discussion by returning to the theme of multiple
enforcers, this time at the federal level. In his presentation on
overlapping jurisdiction in merger enforcement between the FERC, the
Antitrust Division, and the FTC he concluded with his preference for
real antitrust review for the antitrust agencies, but acknowledged the
importance of the role of the FERC during the long transition period
until full market competition. 26 James Serota of Vinson & Elkins
followed with a look at the critical issue of what constitutes monopoly
pricing in times of shortage, distinguishing between those prices which
are the result of market conditions and those which derive from the
individual or collective exercise of market power. 27 John Hilke, the
head economist for the Federal Trade Commission's electricity project,
followed with an insightful discussion of the ways that markets can be
structured and consumers can be empowered to defeat exercises of
market power and deceptive practices. 28 The principal papers were
followed by commentary represented in this conference issue by the
written comments of Albert Foer, the President of the American
Antitrust Institute, who focused on the role of antitrust during the
critical transition
period between regulation and true market
29
competition.
Professor Robert Fellmeth of the University of San Diego School of
Law, one of the country's leading public interest lawyers, was the
featured speaker for the panel on the consumer protection/deregulation
dilemma. Professor Fellmeth gave an impassioned fiery populist
response to the events in California and discussed how to prevent their

benefited greatly from the participation at the conference of John Hilke and Michael Wroblewski
of the FTC who have played important roles in the FTC's ongoing work in this area including coauthorship of the FFC's outstanding recent reports on electrical power regulatory reform. See
2001 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3; FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF, COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM (July

2000).
26. Milton A. Marquis, DOJ, FTC and FERC Electric Power Merger Enforcement: Are There
Too Many Cooks in the Merger Review Kitchen?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 783 (2002).
27. James I. Serota, Monopoly Pricing in a Time of Shortage, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 791 (2002).
28. John C. Hilke, A Consumer Self-Defense Perspective on Electricity Markets, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 805 (2002).
29. Albert A. Foer, Electricity: Notes on the Transition Phase, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 813
(2002). Mr. Foer is also a member of the advisory board of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust
Studies. The morning panel also included comments by David Gustman of Freeborn & Peters
and JoAnne Bloom, the former Vice President of Regulatory Strategies for Commonwealth
Edison.
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reoccurrence elsewhere in the United States. 30 Professor Fellmeth's3 1
rousing talk was followed by commentary from both Robert Kelter,
the litigation director of the Citizens Utility Board and Paul Bonney, the
Deputy General Counsel of Exelon Corp. on the ongoing issues for
consumers in the deregulatory process both in Illinois and throughout
the country.
The afternoon was reserved for a discussion of lessons to be learned
from the deregulatory process outside the United States, from other
industries, and from the pioneer states which have gone the furthest
down the road toward introducing competition and choice in the
generation and distribution of electrical power. We are pleased to
include in this conference issue the papers of Professor John Kwoka, the
Neil Finnegan Professor of Economics at Northeastern University, on
learning from the deregulation of other industries, 32 and Professor Harry
First of New York University School of Law on the benefits and costs
33
of electrical deregulation in New York.
We are honored to include one additional written comment from a
distinguished individual who was unable to attend the conference itself.
Judge Richard Cudahy of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has devoted much of his career to the study of
competition in regulated industries as a practitioner, member of the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission, leader in the American Bar
Association, teacher, scholar, and judge. He is the author of the
Seventh Circuit's seminal MCI decision which explored the application
of antitrust law to the telecommunications industry at the very inception
of its deregulation 34 and other leading cases dealing with antitrust and

30. Robert C. Fellmeth, Plunging Into Darkness: Energy Deregulation Collides with Scarcity,
33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 823 (2002).
31. Robert Kelter, Peace, Love, Competition. An Initial Look at the Restructuring of Illinois
Residential Energy Markets, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 875 (2002).
32. John E. Kwoka. Jr., Twent.-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power, 33
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 885 (2002).
33. Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience in Electric Utility
Deregulation, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2002). The afternoon also included a presentation by
Jade Eaton of the Antitrust Division on the important, but limited, lessons to be learned from the
foreign experience in electrical deregulation and commentary from Caroline Shoenberger,
Commissioner of the Department of Consumer Services for the City of Chicago, Howard
Learner, the President of the Environmental Law and Policy Center, and Peter Esposito,
Regulatory Counsel of Dynegy, Inc.
34. MCI Communications, Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The "'New" Law of
Monopolization: An Examinationi of MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 595 (1983), reprinted in 26 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 280 (1984).
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regulation. 35 Judge Cudahy was unable to participate in the November
2001 conference because of his prior obligation to sit by designation on
the Third Circuit. We are honored that he was willing to contribute his
thoughts on some of the unanticipated effects of the developments in
California that have shaped so many perceptions of the value and risks
36
of deregulation.
This conference issue represents a snapshot as of the end of 2001 of
one of the most vexing, complicated, and important issues in
competition and consumer protection policy. On behalf of everyone at
the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, the Law Journal and the
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, we hope the perspectives
offered in these papers and comments help guide wise decisions so that
the deregulatory process provides tangible benefits for consumers and
that consumers will have the tools to choose wisely in the newly
emerging competitive markets for energy.

35. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.
1988); U.S. Trotting Ass'n v. Chi. Downs Ass'n., 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
36. See Cudahy, supra note 21.

